Lease Maturity and Initial Rent: Is There a Term Structure for UK Commercial Property Leases? by Shaun A. Bond et al.
  1
Lease Maturity and Initial Rent: Is There a Term Structure for UK 




1, Pavlos Loizou and Patrick McAllister 





This paper investigates the relationship between lease maturity and rent in commercial 
property. Over the last decade market-led changes to lease structures, the threat of 
government intervention and the associated emergence of the Codes of Practice for 
commercial leases have stimulated growing interest in pricing of commercial property 
leases. Seminal work by Grenadier (1995) derived a set of hypotheses about the 
pricing of different lease lengths in different market conditions. Whilst there is a 
compelling theoretical case for and a strong intuitive expectation of differential 
pricing of different lease maturities, to date the empirical evidence is inconclusive.  
 
Two Swedish studies have found mixed results (Gunnelin and Soderbergh 2003 and 
Englund et al 2003). In only half the cases is the null hypothesis that lease length has 
no effect rejected. In the UK, Crosby et al (2003) report counterintuitive results.  In 
some markets, they find that short lease terms are associated with low rents, whilst in 
others they are associated with high rents.     
 
Drawing upon a substantial database of commercial lettings in central London (West 
End and City of London) over the last decade, we investigate the relationship between 
rent and lease maturity.  In particular, we test whether a building quality variable 
omitted in previous studies provides empirical results that are more consistent with 
the theoretical and intuitive a priori expectations. It is found that initial leases rates 
are upward sloping with the lease term and that this relationship is constant over time.   
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Introduction 
 
In the UK the dramatic changes to leasing patterns in the 1990s and the increase in the 
political salience of the subject has produced growing interest in lease pricing from 
real estate researchers.  Researchers have proposed a range of models drawn from 
economic theory, most substantially from real options, to analyse lease pricing 
problems and offer optimal pricing solutions.  However, despite the controversy 
surrounding the topic, there has been little empirical investigation of whether 
variation in lease terms produces variation in rents.  In this paper, we use a sample of 
935 London office leases granted between 1994 and 2004 to investigate the 
relationship between lease length and initial lease rates. Previous research (Soderberg 
and Gunnelin 2003 and Englund et al (2003) has found some evidence of a term 
structure in lease payments that varies over time.  
 
For many UK property investors, government intervention in the commercial property 
leasing market has been perceived as a threat.  Average lease lengths have been 
falling steadily throughout the last decade to produce a shift in the risk pendulum 
from tenants to landlords (ODPM, 2004). For landlords, shorter lease lengths are 
associated with decreases in income security.  Shorter leases tend to produce 
increased possibilities of; voids and associated additional costs, falls in rent, 
negotiation weakness, additional exposure to risks associated with depreciation and 
repair and maintenance, potential changes to quality of tenant and new lease and 
consequent reduced liquidity.  Consequently, the expected financial costs associated 
with potential letting termination are driven by the timing and probability of tenant 
vacation, the projected costs of a letting termination and the probability that the rent 
passing will exceed the Market Rent at the point of potential letting termination.  
 
The positive value of an option to vacate will in most circumstances lie with tenants 
who benefit from increased flexibility in the management of their operational property 
holdings, the negotiating advantage associated with the ability to make the landlord 
incur costs associated with tenant vacation and the possibility of a downward 
adjustment of rent.  From the tenant’s perspective the main risks of long leases relate 
to the expected costs of exit.  These will be determined by the actual costs of exit and 
the probability of an exit requirement.  Such costs will be variable according to   3
business sector, individual company and market conditions.  Key factors will be fit 
outs costs, anticipated growth/contraction in the company, business structure of the 
company, the use in which the premises are put (core versus secondary) and rate of  
building and locational obsolescence and depreciation. 
 
Further, in order to assess the tenant’s position it is important to appreciate the 
available alternative options.  In a long lease, these are to assign the lease, to sublet 
surplus space or to negotiate surrender with the landlord. The relative cost of 
‘exercising’ these options is dependent upon market conditions at the point of desired 
termination of occupation.  In ‘hot’ letting markets, it is reasonable to assume that 
there is a high probability that a lease can be assigned, surplus space can be sublet or 
that a landlord will accept a surrender payment.  However, in a market downturn, the 
demand for premises will be lower with obvious consequences for the probability and 
costs of assignment/subletting and surrender.   
 
This discussion begins to generate expectations about the pricing of leases in the 
commercial property market.  We expect that leases which produce increased risks for 
investors should provide an increased return (higher rent).  However, it is clear that at 
a given point in time expected risk will vary with systematic (expectations of future 
market conditions) and specific factors (quality of building/location, tenant quality).  
Indeed it is possible to envision circumstances where shorter leases would generate a 
reduced rent.   For instance, where the investor expects a market recovery in future, 





The most influential recent work on lease pricing is Grenadier’s (1995) analysis of a 
whole range of lease options.  Grenadier explores the analogy of different lease 
lengths being comparable to bonds with different maturities.  He sets out to produce 
an equilibrium rent for any length of lease and a term structure of lease rates 
analogous to a term structure of interest rates.  His approach is to set out the processes 
by which short-term rents are generated – in essence by interaction of the evolution 
(as a geometric Brownian motion) of supply, demand and asset values.  It is assumed   4
that the value of a service flow (rent) from a lease can be replicated by buying the 
asset and writing a European call option on the underlying asset.
2  In simple terms, a 
lease can be represented as buying the property and agreeing that the seller has the 
right to reclaim the property at the end of the period of use. The seller would only 
reclaim the property if it had some positive value. Given the above, the value of the 
rent is the (equilibrium) value of the freehold interest less the value of a European call 
option exercisable at the end of the proposed lease period.  Having established the 
value of the call option, the equilibrium long-term lease payment is an annual 
equivalent of the difference. 
 
Using this model, Grenadier offers a set of hypotheses about the pattern of lease 
lengths in different market conditions.  In the vein of the term structure of interest 
rates, he describes three possible term structure shapes – downward-sloping, upward-
sloping and single-humped.  It is hypothesised that a downward-sloping curve would 
be associated with a ‘hot’ market where there is a high ratio between capital values 
and construction costs.  This creates an incentive to build and generates an 
expectation of an increase in supply with rents falling in the future.  Given this 
expectation occupiers place higher values on short leases relative to long leases since 
they do not wish to be ‘stuck with’ a fixed rent in a falling market.  Landlords, in turn, 
prefer longer leases where rental falls are expected and would rationally accept less 
rent relative to short leases. Conversely, in a ‘cold’ market, the curve is upward 
sloping.  Occupiers expect a lack of new supply, in turn, creating an expectation of 
future rental increases and rationally pay more for long fixed rent terms.  For 
intermediate cases, the term structure takes a single-humped shape, with no 
anticipated supply in the short term but a supply response expected in the medium 
term, occupiers pay more for protection against short term rises in rent but expect 
rents to fall in the medium term.   
 
Although the model does not take into account transaction costs, vacancies/non-
renewals and taxes, there is a powerful message that short lease terms should not 
automatically produce higher rents.  For fixed rent leases and for a short lease 
                                                 
2 Essentially the occupier/investor can get identical value (compared to a lease) by buying the freehold 
interest in the asset today whilst simultaneously receiving the present value of the freehold interest at 
the end of hypothetical lease term.   5
landlords will require different rents depending on their expectations of future market 
conditions.  If they expect market conditions to improve in the future, they should 
regard short leases more favourably compared to an expectation of deteriorating 
market conditions.  Grenadier’s work revealed the optionality inherent in real estate 
interests and the key role of rental volatility and the model of behaviour in rents.  
However, it is based upon a hypothesis of landlord behaviour – the expectations 
hypothesis – that works well in explaining the term structure of interest rates.  It is 
questionable, to say the least, whether this is an accurate representation of landlord 
behaviour. 
 
Following Grenadier (1995), a number of researchers (Ambrose, Hendershott and 
Klosek, 2002, Booth and Walsh 2002, Hendershott and Ward, 2003 and Stanton and 
Wallace, 2004) utilize the concepts of market equilibrium relationships in the 
development of a model for pricing lease cash flows.  The assumption of market 
equilibrium is important since 
 
“The equilibrium context implies that in an efficient market, all leases with 
the same maturity should provide the same present value to the lessor, 
irrespective of whether the rental rate is fixed, fully variable or partially 
variable” (Ambrose et al, 2002, 35) 
Typically drawing upon standard option pricing theory, they make a number of 
assumptions about risk free rates, drift coefficients (growth in rents), volatility and 
rental behaviour to devise hypothetical optimal pricing solutions. 
 
Whilst the work cited above focuses on assets values to the investor, McCann and 
Ward (2004) examine the optimal lease length from the tenants’ perspectives and 
question the applicability of a term structure.  The premise is that from the tenant’s 
point of view, the cost of space varies with the lease length quite independently from 
the term structure of rental rates so that the value of a lease to a tenant is not 
exogenously given.  In other words, the standard assumption that landlords will 
extract the same value from the property regardless of leases structure is disputed. The 
occupancy value will therefore be a function of tenant-specific and market variables – 
legal and search costs, relocation probability and costs, rent and repairing costs,   6
opportunity costs and ability to assign.   They develop a model which, given certain 
assumptions, prices the range of lease lengths for individual tenants.  Their key 
conclusion is that there is a clientele effect that overlays the financial equivalence of 
different lease lengths.  In essence, landlords should maximise returns by ensuring 
that the asset is leased to the tenant (segment) for whom it is the optimal lease.   The 
real world observation is that clearly some tenants require long leases for the purposes 
of being able to recover their initial costs or because of the goodwill associated with 
the site; department stores and head offices of major companies tend to move 
infrequently, small companies may prefer, for business reasons, to take on short leases 
if they plan to expand or re-locate within their planning horizon. In these 
circumstances, business reasons dominate the term structure of rents and it is not 
possible to trade between different clienteles in the way associated with financial 
models of term structure and arbitrage. 
 
Following Grenadier’s (1995) suggestion that hypothetical pricing solutions should be 
compared with actual market rents, there has been work that has attempted to identify 
a term structure of lease rates.  At the aggregate level, there are significant 
methodological issues in isolating the effects of lease terms on rents as researchers are 
faced with problems of trying to disentangle the effects on rents of tenant and building 
quality and market conditions from lease provisions.   Typically this work has 
modelled observed rent as a function of a range of lease, market and property-specific 
factors.  Typically empirical findings have been inconclusive. 
 
In the US much of the work on rent determination has focussed on exploring the 
relationship between base and percentage rents in shopping malls (see Wheaton, 2000, 
Miceli and Sirmans, 1995, Ambrose, Hendershott and Klosek, 2002, Ward and 
Hendershott, 2003).  However, Mooradian and Yang (2000) explicitly focused the 
lease pricing effects of ability to exit. They examined a sample of 311 leases sign by a 
single public corporation (an attractive tenant) between 1992 and 1994 – a period of 
weak economic performance and high vacancy rates.  They attempt to isolate the 
significance of options to cancel the lease, downsize (decrease the amount of space 
occupied) and sublet.  They find that the only variable that has significant effect on 
rent is the right to downsize.  However, only 10% of leases had a downsize clause 
compared to 30% and 49% that had options to cancel the lease or sublet respectively.    7
A possible explanation for the observation of a rental premium for this variable is that 
it was not typical market practice.  
 
Overcoming the problems of potential sample bias inherent in studies based upon a 
single landlord or tenant, Stanton and Wallace (2004) compare and contrast  modelled  
of spot leases rates with observed rents for 711 lease originated between 1987 and 
1996.  They derive implied structure of forward rents for a range of metropolitan areas 
as of September 1997.  Whilst acknowledging a lack of precision for some of the 
model inputs they find term structures that are broadly consistent with the prior 
expectations.  However, the ‘predicted’ rents are not consistent with observed rents 
implying mispricings in the market. With particular relevance to this study, they find 
that the length of the lease has a statistically positive effect on realised rent whilst 
credit worthy tenants and increased size of letting lead to significant reductions in 
rent.  
 
Similarly two Swedish studies argued that previous studies fail to allow for possible 
variation in the term structure of lease length.  Gunnelin and Soderbergh (2003) report 
that differences in lease terms have statistically significant effects on commercial 
rents in the Stockholm CBD for 7 out of 15 years between 1977 and 1991.  Partially 
confirming the term structure of lease rates, they identify an upward sloping curve in 
the bullish 1980s and a downward sloping curve in the bearish 1990s.    Englund et al 
(2003) find much more mixed results for more recent trends in three Swedish centres.  
In only half the cases is the null hypothesis that lease length has no effect rejected and 
there is typically an upward slope in the terms structure of lease rates.  This was 
counterintuitive given the market conditions and it suggests that the research, 
hampered by a lack of variations in the lease structures, has struggled to cope with the 
problems of isolating the effects of lease terms on rents from the other variables.   
 
This is the case with ODPM (2004) who, in similar work in the UK, report similar 
counterintuitive results.  In some markets, they find that short lease terms are 
associated with low rents, whilst in others they are associated with high rents.  It is 
difficult to assess whether this is due to genuine term structure effects.  ODPM (2004) 
suggest two other possible explanations for the findings.  First, the model is failing to 
account sufficiently for the effects of tenant quality and building/location   8
characteristics relative to lease terms – an argument that would be consistent with the 
McCann and Ward paper.  Second, and more interesting, is an implied behavioural 
explanation for the lack of an impact of lease terms on rent.  Their interview survey of 
market participants found that in the process of rent negotiation, agreement on rent 
usually preceded agreement on detailed lease terms.  This could be explained either 
by both parties have common views on the characteristics of the leases even before 
the terms were settled or that the bargaining structure was inefficient within the 
current institutional environment. Although there has been little explicit research on 
the potential of cognitive biases to affect lease prices, it is clear that this may be a 
fruitful area of investigation.  Rental expectations are central to the issue of lease 
pricing. Behavioural finance, with its roots in the psychological study of human 
decision making, has found that individuals often do not process information 
efficiently when making judgements about complex problems.  Consequently, 
judgement and decision-making can be distorted by apparent irrationality and bias.  
 
In summary, there are grounds to expect that observed rents will be conditioned by the 
terms of occupation.  Ceteris paribus, we should expect that variations in lease terms 
should produce variations in observed rents.  Lease length, in particular, is regarded as 
an important determinant of the risk in the cash flows delivered by leased real estate 
assets.  However, in addition to differences in risks among different assets and 
sectors, expectations about risks of future cash flows will vary over time.  Analogous 
to bond markets, a priori, we should not expect to observe a static rental premium or 
discount across different sectors and over time.   
 
Estimating a Term Structure of Office Rents 
 
The empirical studies that are most relevant to this study are the papers of Gunnelin 
and Soderberg (2003) and Englund et al (2003). In the first paper the model used both 
linear and quadratic function forms to estimate the term structure relationship. The 
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where leasei is the rental payment for lease i, Facti are characteristics of lease contract 
i such as size, age of building, whether the lease is a renewal of a previous contract 
and the institutional owner of the property occupied in lease i. Dj represents a dummy 
variable for the year in which the lease was originated and Termi is the length of the 
contractual obligation for lease i. The Parameters  i i i λ γ β α , , , 0 are estimated using 
OLS.  
 
Englund et al (2003) present a similar model, except no parametric form is placed on 
the relationship between lease rental and term. While this may have advantages in 
allowing a flexible functional relationship between rental and term to be estimated, it 
comes at the expense of an increased number of parameters requiring estimation. This 
is a particularly issue in this study as the term of the leases often reaches 25 years or 
more. 
 
A major methodological issue not encountered in the studies just mentioned, but of 
high relevance to the present paper, is the treatment of option clauses, such as lease 
break and upward-only rent reviews. Stanton and Wallace (2004) provide an 
extensive discussion of these issues and recommend using options-based valuation of 
each lease clause. They construct a net present value for the cash flows from each 
lease and use this measure in estimating the term structure of lease payments
3. In the 
present paper we adopt an empirical approach to this issue. Firstly, as the five year 
upward-only rent review is a common institutional feature of the London office 
market, it is assumed that any adjustment that would be made to the value of each 
lease would be common to all leases. Hence the relative lease payments are unlikely 
to be affected. Secondly, with regard to lease breaks, we consider alternative 
functional forms that take into consideration the possible impact of the break 
provision on the rental payment. These alternative functional forms are discussed in 
the next section.  
 
Where information is provided on rent-free periods we calculate an effective lease 
cost which spreads the savings from the rent-free period over the term of the lease. 
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Data 
 
The primary dataset used in this study is based on information collected by CB 
Richard Ellis. This database consisted of 726 leases for the City of London office 
market and 394 leases for the West End market. Figure 1 in the appendix displays a 
map of the London office market showing the West End and City markets, in addition 
to other main submarkets. A possible limitation of the data available from CB Richard 
Ellis is that it consists of leases where the underlying occupied space is almost always 
greater than 10,000 square feet in size. At first this may seem a limitation however, it 
may provide a simple way to control for tenant quality. As we do not have 
information on tenant credit worthiness it is assumed that larger tenants are likely to 
be more credit worthy than occupiers with smaller space requirements. 
 
To supplement the analysis and check that the results obtained are not biased due to 
the restricted nature of the leases in the database, we compared the results obtained 
from the models, with estimates obtained from using data from the Estates Gazette 
service. This dataset is larger than the CB Richard Ellis data and covers lease 
transactions of varying sizes and from more locations in London. However, 
information on lease breaks and rent-free periods is not as detailed as widely available 
and the quality of the information, which is input from a wide variety of sources, is 
more difficult to ascertain
4.  
 
After sorting the CBRE data and removing outlying observations or information from 
years in which there were few observations, the number of leases that remained in the 
data set was 935. These leases covered the period from 1994 to 2004. A summary of 
the characteristics of these leases is shown in Table 1. 
 
The information in Table 1 provides a breakdown on the sample leases by area as well 
as reporting the aggregate totals. From the table it can be seen that the sample is 
dominated by lease contracts for office space in the City of London (595 as opposed 
to 340 from the West End). The initial rents are higher in the City, £345.09 per m
2, 
compared to £323.77 per m
2 in the West End. The average space covered by the lease   11
contracts is also higher in the City (3,506.95 m
2) than the West End (2,355.17m
2). The 
higher rents on leases for City properties may reflect the higher portion of Grade A 
properties in the sample (67% for City and 46% for West End). In the current sample 
24% of all leases in the City had break clauses reported (10% for the West End) and 
the average length of time before the break could be exercised was 9.06 years (8.71 
years for the West End). Average lease lengths were slightly shorter in the West End 
(13.28 years) compared to the City (14.47 years).  
 
The fact that the sample only considers leases where the occupied area is greater than 
10,000 square feet may explain the characteristics observed in the sample. Typically 
the stock of office space in the West End is older with smaller floor plates compared 
to office space in the City. Properties in the City tend to be more modern with larger 
capacity floor plates designed to appeal to large corporate occupiers from the financial 
services sector.   
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of leases by lease length and year of origination. There 
are distinct peaks in the lease terms centred around the periods of 10, 15, 20 and 25 
years. There are few leases in the sample less than 5 years in maturity. This stands in 
contrast to the data presented in Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003) where most of the 
leases had maturities of less than five years with very few observations above seven 
years. From the data presented in this table there is little evidence to suggest that lease 
lengths are falling in the London office market. However, this should be interpreted in 
light of the nature of the sample, which is limited to large office space requirements. 
In these instance occupiers are likely to prefer longer lease terms due to the high 
frictional costs of relocating large numbers of employees and fitting out the premises. 




To estimate the term structure model we use a variation of model (1) based on the 
Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003) study. The first specification assumes a linear 
relationship between term length and initial rent. 
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where leasei is the initial real rental payment for lease i, Sizei is the amount of space 
occupied, bki is the length of the lease break provision if one is included in the lease, 
GrBi is a dummy variable for leases where the occupied space is in Grade B 
properties and similarly GrCi is a dummy variable to denote the occupied space is in a 
Grade C property. Loci is a location dummy variable which takes the value 1 for lease 
in the West End market. Dj represents a dummy variable for the year in which the 
lease was originated and covers the years from 1995 to 2004. Termi is the length of 
the contractual obligation for lease i. The multiplicative dummy variables Dj cover the 
period from 1994 to 2004. 
 
Note that in all cases the real rent is used as the dependent variable in the model. The 
real rental value is obtained by deflating the nominal rent value of each lease by the 
corresponding value of the implicit price deflator of domestic final demand in the 
same year. 
 
An alternative specification suggested in Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003) is to allow a 
quadratic specification for the term structure relationship. Adding a term to equation 
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where Termi
2 is the square of the length of lease i. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
in the CBRE data set.   13
The outcome from applying OLS to equations (2) and (3) are shown in Tables 3 and 4 
respectively. All standard errors are calculated using White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent covariance estimates. 
 
Table 3 reveals a number of interesting results. There appears to be a strong linear 
association between the term structure variable and initial lease rates. The interactive 
lease maturity variable is significant and position in each year except for 1996. This 
result is much stronger than that found in Gunnelin and Soderberg. The positive sign 
on this variable is counterintuitive as it suggests that occupiers pay a higher lease to 
have a longer term. Such a result appears to go against anecdotal evidence from 
market participants which suggest that lower initial lease rates may be obtained by 
taking a longer lease term.  
 
The individual year dummy variables provide some indication of the changing market 
conditions in London. Incremental lease rates increased from 1996 to 2002 before 
falling sharply in 2003 and 2004. This does appear to be consistent with market 
evidence that the late 1990s and early part of this decade saw strong increases in rent 
due to the expansion in financial service and technology related employment. 
However, following the downturn in these sectors in 2001 the leasing market has been 
considerably weaker.  
 
The coefficient for size is negatively signed as expected, indicating that occupiers 
taking larger amounts of space receive a lower initial rent that those with smaller 
space requirements. The signs of the dummy variables for grade of building and 
location are also as expected with occupiers in lower grade buildings paying lower 
initial rents than those in grade A space. Also occupiers in the West End pay higher 
rates per square meter than those in the City when all other factors are held constant.  
 
Finally the coefficient on the break variable is significant and negative. This finding 
also seems unusual as it is usually perceived that break clauses provide advantages for 
tenants and negotiated as part of a rental agreement it is likely that a premium would 
be paid for this option. However, there is an expectation that the value of this option 
would fall as the time to expiry increases. We will return to this issue at a later point. 
   14
The overall fit of the equation is satisfactory with an R2 of 45%, which implies that 
just under half of the variation in initial lease rates is explained by equation (2). To 
assess whether the nature of the term structure variable is changing we test the 
hypothesis that the coefficients from TM94 to TM04 are all equal. The resulting F-test 
statistic is 0.773, which implies the hypothesis cannot be rejected
5. That is, there does 
not appear to be a changing pattern to the relationship between lease length and initial 
rent in the London office market.  
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (4). The difference between this table 
and the previous is the inclusion of the square of the interactive lease term variables 
(shown as TM94_2 to TM04_2 in Table 4). Only two of the quadratic terms are 
significant in Table 4 (in 1999 and 2001). Interestingly, the sign of the squared terms 
from 2001 onwards are all negative whereas previously the squared terms were 
positive (though with little significance). The remaining variables are essentially 
unchanged with the exception of the year dummy variables. In this case the dummy 
variables now suggest that initial rental rates peaked in 1999 with large falls occurring 
in 2003 and 2004. However, as only the dummy variable for 1999 is significant this 
finding needs to be treated with caution.  
 
The relationship between term and initial lease rates is explored further by 
considering the test of a null hypothesis of the equality of the interactive term 









                                                             (5) 
is evaluated. It is found that this null is not rejected
6. Again this is evidence that the 
term structure of initial lease rates does not appear to be changing.  As a final test we 
examine the hypothesis that the coefficients of the squared interactive lease term 
variables are jointly equal to 0. The F statistic of 1.65 is rejected at the significance 
level of 10% but is not rejected at the 5% level
7. 
 
                                                 
5 F(10,908) = 0.773, p-value = 0.66 
6 F(20,897)=1.037, p-value = 0.414. 
7 F(11,897)=1.651, p-value = 0.08. Note that a test that all term structure variables are jointly equal to 
zero is rejected with F(22,897) = 5.118, p-value = 0.00.   15
In light of these hypothesis test findings we reparameterise the model to remove the 
interactive dummy variables for year of origination and term. These are replaced by 
variables for the lease term and lease term squared. The resulting model is shown in 
Table 5.  
 
All parameters in this model are statistically significant at the 10% level with the 
exception of the dummy variables for origination years 1995 and 2004. The pattern of 
the dummy variable coefficients once again shows the increases in rent up to 2003 
before falling quite sharply. The lease term and lease term squared variable are both 
statistically significant and confirm a quadratic relationship between (log) rents and 
lease length. The location and grade variables are all strongly significant and the lease 
break term is significant and negative.  
 
Finally the limitation of the data set with regard to lease size if further considered. As 
there are few leases in the sample below five years we re-estimate the previous model 
after removing all leases below five years from the data set. The resulting estimates 
are shown in Table 6. The overall magnitude of the parameter estimates is broadly 
similar to Table 5. A notable difference is that the coefficient of the squared term 
variable is no longer significant.    
 
The information in Tables 5 and 6 can be used to plot the term structure of (real) 
initial lease rates in the London office market. To draw the curve it is assumed that the 
current year is 2004, the representative office is taken to be in the City of London and 
has a floor area equal to the average size shown in Table 1 (3,506.95 sq m). The 
resulting curves are shown in Figure 3. In both cases an upward sloping curve linking 
initial lease rates to the term of the lease is observed.  
   
Before concluding we provide a further discussion of the empirical treatment of lease 
breaks in the contacts. Two additional models were considered, one that removes all 
lease contracts with a break in the sample and another that treats lease break as being 
equal to the terminal maturity
8. 
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It was found that when all leases with a break clause were removed from the sample 
and the model estimated using the remaining observations (615 remained), the 
parameter estimate were very similar to those obtained in Table 5 (results not 
reported). The sign of the lease length variable remained positive.  
 
When the lease maturity was taken to be the minimum of either the lease break term 
or the lease term it was found that the term structure of initial lease rates was still 
upward sloping (results not reported). The signs of the term and term squared variable 
were reversed but this simply meant that the initial lease rates grew rapidly once lease 
terms reached above 20 years. The explanatory power of this model was also lower 
than the other equations estimated. 
  
As a final check on the robustness of the results we applied the equations (2) and (3) 
to an alternative lease data set obtained from the Estates Gazette. This contained a 
larger number of leases than the CBRE data and covered more regions within London. 
However, there were concerns about the reliability of the data which is why this 
dataset did not form the core data used in this study. When the models were estimated 
it was found that a similar upward sloping term structure in initial lease rates 
appeared. This confirms that the findings of this study are unlikely to be due to 





In this paper we have investigated the relationship between lease length and initial 
lease rates in the London office market. This follows earlier work by Gunnelin and 
Soderberg (2003) and Englund et al (2003). Data on 935 office leases, originated 
between 1994 and 2004, in the City of London and the West End were used to 
estimate models of initial lease rates holding constant for lease characteristics such as 
size, location, quality of building, year of origination, timing of lease breaks and lease 
term. While a term structure of initial lease rates was found, unlike the previous 
studies, it did not appear to change over time. There was also mixed evidence on 
whether a linear or quadratic form for the term structure was most appropriate. 
                                                 
9 Results not reported but are available on request from the authors.   17
 
A surprising result was that the term structure of initial lease rates was upward sloping 
in lease term. This implies that occupiers requiring longer leases pay higher initial 
rates than those requiring shorter leases. Such a finding appears at odds with market 
evidence of lease transactions and may reflect uncontrolled for factors relating to 
tenant quality (or credit rating), micro-location factors affecting rent for similar 
buildings and lease terms, the option-related elements of lease contracts (such as rent 
reviews) or possible unrecorded payments by landlords contributing to “fit-out” costs 
or other transaction-related incentives. This finding also held constant when the few 
shorter leases in the sample were removed on the model estimated only including 
leases greater than five year. 
 
In order to control for lease breaks we adopted an empirical approach to the issue 
rather than using the option-valuation solution of Stanton and Wallace (2004). The 
value of the break clauses was found to fall as the time to break period increased. 
Removing leases from the sample that included a break clause did not affect the 
outcome of the study.  
 
Finally as a robustness check we estimated the econometric models on a similar data 
set obtained from Estates Gazette. The finding of an upward sloping term structure to 
initial lease rates was still evident in this alternative data set.  
   18
References 
Ambrose B.  Hendershott, P.  and Klosek, M. 2002 Pricing Upward-Only 
Adjusting Leases, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 25, 33-49. 
Booth P and Walsh D 2001 An option pricing approach to valuing upward 
only rent review properties with multiple reviews. Insurance: Mathematics 
and Economics, 28, 151-171. 
Booth P and Walsh D 2001b The application of financial theory to the pricing 
of upward-only rent reviews, Journal of Property Research, 18(1), 69-83. 
Englund P, Gunnelin A , Hoesli M and Söderberg B Implicit Forward Rents 
As Predictors Of Future Rents Aberdeen Papers In Accountancy, Finance & 
Management 
Grenadier, S.R 1995 The valuation of leasing contracts: a real options 
approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 38: 297-331. 
Gunnelin, Å . and B. Söderberg. 2003. Term Structures in the Office Rental 
Market in Stockholm. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 26(2/3): 
241 265. 
Hendershott P and Ward C 2003 Valuing and pricing retail leases with 
renewal and overage options,  Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 
26(2/3), 223-240 
Miceli T and Sirmans, C. 1995 Contracting with spatial externalities and 
agency problems: the case of retail leases. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 25, 355-372 
McCann, P. and Ward, C. 2003 Real Estate Rental Payments: Application of 
Stock-Inventory Modelling The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 28(2). 
Mooradian R and Yang, S 2000 Cancellation strategies in commercial real 
estate leasing, Real Estate Economics, 28, 65-88. 
ODPM 2004 Monitoring the code of practice for commercial leases: interim 
report. The University of Reading, Reading and Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, London. 
ODPM, 2005 Monitoring the code of practice for commercial leases: final 
report. The University of Reading, Reading and Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, London. 
Stanton W and Wallace N 2004 An Empirical Test of a Contingent Claims 
Lease Valuation Model, Working  Paper, Haas School of Business U.C. 
Berkeley.,  
Wheaton, W.C. 2000 Percentage rent in retail leasing: the alignment of 




The Major Segments of the London Office Market 
 
Map provided by CB Richard Ellis. The map displays the key segments, by 
location, in the London market. The data in this study is primarily focused on the 
West End and City markets. 




Summary Characteristic of Lease Contracts 




Full Sample City West End
Rent 337.34 345.09 323.77
    Std deviation 144.40 141.86 147.96
Real Rent 349.10 355.54 337.83
    Std deviation 140.82 138.34 144.58
Size (m2) 3,088.12 3,506.95 2355.17
    Std deviation 4,504.81 5,231.56 2666.09
Term 14.03 14.47 13.28
    Std deviation 5.54 5.60 5.37
% Grade A 59 67 46
% Grade B 26 23 32
% Grade C 15 10 22
No. of lease breaks 320 225 95
% lease breaks 34 24 10
Break length 8.96 9.06 8.71
Number 935 595 340
Data provided by CBRE. Table contains the summary statistics of the lease contracts in the sample.
In addition to reporting the full sampel results the summary statistics are also broken down by area
(City and West End). The table reports average initial rent, average real rent, average size and
average term of the lease contracts as well as their respective standard deviations. Real rent is the
nominal initial rent deflated by the implicit price deflator of domestic final demand. % Grade A, B &
C shows the percentage of the sample leases involving the respective grade of property. No. of lease
breaks shows how many leases in the sample contain break clauses and % lease breaks give the
respective percentage relative to the total number of leases. Break length is the average term until the
breal clause can be exercised for those leases that contain such clauses. Number is the number of



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Linear Regression Results for Equation (2) 
London Office Leases, 1994 to 2004. 
Standard Prob
Variable Coefficient Error t-ratio >|t|
CONST 5.199 0.224 23.200 0.00
LS -0.057 0.016 -3.481 0.00
D95 -0.089 0.229 -0.389 0.70
D96 0.248 0.249 0.994 0.32
D97 0.248 0.222 1.118 0.26
D98 0.301 0.227 1.326 0.19
D99 0.486 0.250 1.942 0.05
D00 0.480 0.211 2.274 0.02
D01 0.591 0.267 2.210 0.03
D02 0.885 0.244 3.625 0.00
D03 0.183 0.351 0.522 0.60
D04 -0.133 0.243 -0.549 0.58
TM94 0.023 0.010 2.300 0.02
TM95 0.022 0.009 2.419 0.02
TM96 0.015 0.012 1.213 0.23
TM97 0.023 0.008 2.993 0.00
TM98 0.033 0.008 4.115 0.00
TM99 0.034 0.010 3.508 0.00
TM00 0.035 0.006 5.438 0.00
TM01 0.038 0.011 3.629 0.00
TM02 0.025 0.009 2.726 0.01
TM03 0.034 0.021 1.636 0.10
TM04 0.039 0.010 3.792 0.00
LBK -0.033 0.014 -2.310 0.02
GRB -0.197 0.038 -5.251 0.00
GRC -0.418 0.050 -8.318 0.00
LOC 0.268 0.034 7.807 0.00
Total cases: 935 Valid cases: 935
Total SS: 344.995 Degrees of freedom: 908
R-squared: 0.449 Rbar-squared: 0.433
Residual SS: 190.229 Std error of est: 0.458
F(26,908): 28.413 Probability of F: 0
Durbin-Watson: 1.702
The results above are derived from applying equation (2) to the CBRE data
set. The variable LS is ln(size), D95 to D04 are dummy variables representing
the years 1995 to 2004. Tm94 to TM04 are interactive dummy variables from
the year multiplied by the term length. LMK is ln(break), where break is the
length of break for the lease (if it is available). GRB and GRC are dummy
variables for B grade and C grade properties respectively. LOC is a dummy
variable for location which takes the value of 1 for leases in the West End.
Variables and parameters highlighted in bold font denotes significance at the
10% level.    24
Table 4 
Linear Regression Results for Equation (3) 
London Office Leases, 1994 to 2004. 
Standard Prob
Variable Coefficient Error t-ratio >|t|
CONST 4.763 0.535 8.901 0.00
LS -0.052 0.017 -3.079 0.00
D95 0.330 0.600 0.551 0.58
D96 0.672 0.650 1.033 0.30
D97 0.583 0.570 1.024 0.31
D98 0.867 0.574 1.512 0.13
D99 1.344 0.592 2.270 0.02
D00 0.795 0.603 1.319 0.19
D01 0.597 0.607 0.984 0.33
D02 0.810 0.666 1.218 0.22
D03 0.071 0.870 0.081 0.94
D04 -0.051 0.614 -0.083 0.93
TM94 0.078 0.065 1.211 0.23
TM95 0.018 0.036 0.519 0.60
TM96 0.011 0.052 0.207 0.84
TM97 0.033 0.028 1.178 0.24
TM98 0.005 0.028 0.177 0.86
TM99 -0.036 0.033 -1.084 0.28
TM00 0.047 0.035 1.359 0.17
TM01 0.112 0.034 3.319 0.00
TM02 0.092 0.048 1.911 0.06
TM03 0.125 0.099 1.257 0.21
TM04 0.098 0.046 2.159 0.03
TM94_2 -0.002 0.002 -0.933 0.35
TM95_2 0.000 0.001 0.088 0.93
TM96_2 0.000 0.002 0.069 0.95
TM97_2 0.000 0.001 -0.414 0.68
TM98_2 0.001 0.001 1.104 0.27
TM99_2 0.002 0.001 2.238 0.03
TM00_2 0.000 0.001 -0.420 0.67
TM01_2 -0.003 0.001 -2.752 0.01
TM02_2 -0.002 0.001 -1.549 0.12
TM03_2 -0.003 0.003 -1.052 0.29
TM04_2 -0.002 0.002 -1.471 0.14
TM03_2 -0.003 0.003 -1.033 0.30
TM04_2 -0.002 0.002 -1.468 0.14
LBK -0.032 0.014 -2.234 0.03
GRB -0.199 0.038 -5.289 0.00
GRC -0.411 0.050 -8.272 0.00
LOC 0.266 0.034 7.828 0.00
Total cases: 935 Valid cases: 935
Total SS: 344.995 Degrees of freedom: 897
R-squared: 0.46 Rbar-squared: 0.437
Residual SS: 186.455 Std error of est: 0.456
F(37,897): 20.614 Probability of F: 0
Durbin-Watson: 1.708
The results above are derived from applying equation (3) to the CBRE data set.
The variable LS is ln(size), D95 to D04 are dummy variables representing the
years 1995 to 2004. Tm94 to TM04 are interactive dummy variables from the
year multiplied by the term length. TM94_2 to TM04_2 represents the square of
the interative lease term. LMK is ln(break), where break is the length of break for
the lease (if it is available). GRB and GRC are dummy variables for B grade and
C grade properties respectively. LOC is a dummy variable for location which
takes the value of 1 for leases in the West End. Variables and parameters
highlighted in bold font denotes significance at the 10% level.
   25
 
Table 5 
Linear Regression Results Initial Rent 
London Office Leases, 1994 to 2004. 
Standard Prob
Variable Coefficient Error t-ratio >|t|
CONST 4.916 0.176 27.910 0.00
LS -0.053 0.016 -3.217 0.00
TM 0.055 0.013 4.106 0.00
TM2 -0.001 0.000 -2.168 0.03
LBK -0.036 0.014 -2.499 0.01
GRB -0.199 0.038 -5.285 0.00
GRC -0.407 0.051 -7.933 0.00
LOC 0.268 0.034 7.863 0.00
D95 -0.108 0.077 -1.399 0.16
D96 0.145 0.085 1.708 0.09
D97 0.246 0.075 3.286 0.00
D98 0.439 0.073 6.008 0.00
D99 0.636 0.079 8.069 0.00
D00 0.652 0.072 9.119 0.00
D01 0.830 0.077 10.766 0.00
D02 0.906 0.076 11.880 0.00
D03 0.333 0.108 3.091 0.00
D04 0.081 0.084 0.970 0.33
Total cases: 935 Valid cases: 935
Total SS: 344.995 Degrees of freedom: 917
R-squared: 0.447 Rbar-squared: 0.437
Residual SS: 190.766 Std error of est: 0.456
F(17,917): 43.61 Probability of F: 0
Durbin-Watson: 1.689
The results above are derived from applying equation (2) to the CBRE
data set. The variable LS is ln(size), D95 to D04 are dummy variables
representing the years 1995 to 2004. TM is the term of the lease and
TM2 is the square of term of the lease length. LMK is ln(break), where
break is the length of break for the lease (if it is available). GRB and
GRC are dummy variables for B grade and C grade properties
respectively. LOC is a dummy variable for location which takes the value
of 1 for leases in the West End. Variables and parameters highlighted in
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Table 6 
Linear Regression Results Initial Rent 




































Variable Coefficient Error t-ratio >|t|
CONST 5.071 0.186 27.233 0.00
D95 -0.109 0.078 -1.407 0.16
D96 0.151 0.085 1.769 0.08
D97 0.245 0.075 3.261 0.00
D98 0.453 0.074 6.144 0.00
D99 0.641 0.079 8.106 0.00
D00 0.659 0.072 9.171 0.00
D01 0.913 0.073 12.531 0.00
D02 0.932 0.076 12.278 0.00
D03 0.359 0.106 3.377 0.00
D04 0.104 0.083 1.243 0.21
LS -0.054 0.016 -3.310 0.00
TM 0.036 0.016 2.292 0.02
TM2 0.000 0.000 -0.752 0.45
LBK -0.034 0.014 -2.407 0.02
GRB -0.214 0.037 -5.748 0.00
GRC -0.407 0.050 -8.079 0.00
LOC 0.266 0.034 7.898 0.00
Total cases: 903 Valid cases: 903
Total SS: 317.822 Degrees of freedom: 885
R-squared: 0.453 Rbar-squared: 0.442
Residual SS: 173.88 Std error of est: 0.443
F(17,885): 43.095 Probability of F: 0
Durbin-Watson: 1.692
The results above are derived from a version of equation (2) to the CBRE
data set. The variable LS is ln(size), D95 to D04 are dummy variables
representing the years 1995 to 2004. TM is the term of the lease and
TM2 is the square of term of the lease length. LMK is ln(break), where
break is the length of break for the lease (if it is available). GRB and
GRC are dummy variables for B grade and C grade properties
respectively. LOC is a dummy variable for location which takes the value
of 1 for leases in the West End. Variables and parameters highlighted in
bold font denotes significance at the 10% level. Note that in this dataset
all leases with a term below five years have been removed. 
2
7
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
T
e
r
m
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
L
e
a
s
e
 
R
a
t
e
s
(
B
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
3
,
5
0
6
 
m
 
s
q
 
l
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
C
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
T
e
r
m
 
o
f
 
L
e
a
s
e
£
 
p
e
r
 
s
q
 
m
 
(
i
n
 
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
2
0
0
1
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
)
M
o
d
e
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
l
l
 
m
a
t
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
E
x
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
l
e
a
s
e
s
 
<
 
5
 
y
e
a
r
s